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implicate constitutional concerns. Those concerns provide even
more reason to avoid addressing Lavabit s new arguments. The
principle of constitutional avoidance . . . requires the federal
courts to avoid rendering constitutional rulings unless
absolutely necessary. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. City of
Alexandria, 608 F.3d 150, 157 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashwander
v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)); see also Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. Prince George s
Cnty., Md., 212 F.3d 863, 865 (4th Cir. 2000) ( [C]ourts should
avoid deciding constitutional questions unless they are
essential to the disposition of a case. ). So, we will not
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Appeal: 13-4625 Doc: 66 Filed: 04/16/2014 Pg: 41 of 41
decide a constitutional question, particularly a complicated
constitutional question, if another ground adequately disposes
of the controversy. Strawser v. Atkins, 290 F.3d 720, 730 (4th
Cir. 2002). The long-established constitutional-avoidance rule
applies squarely to this case.
V.
In view of Lavabit s waiver of its appellate arguments by
failing to raise them in the district court, and its failure to
raise the issue of fundamental or plain error review, there is
no cognizable basis upon which to challenge the Pen/Trap Order.
The district court did not err, then, in finding Lavabit and
Levison in contempt once they admittedly violated that order.
The judgment of the district court is therefore
AFFIRMED.
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